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7.1  Introduction 
Although social security retirement benefits often are thought of as a 
repayment of past contributions, it is now becoming a matter of general 
knowledge that the generation currently retired is receiving far more in re- 
tirement  annuities  than its members contributed  in taxes during their 
working lives (see Aaron 1977; Burkhauser and Warlick 1981; Leimer and 
Petri 1981; Boskin et al. 1983). This is partly due to the state of the social 
security system: the retired generation is still receiving windfall start-up 
gains. These gains will diminish as the system matures and approaches a 
steady state. The excess of benefits over taxes for the presently retired is 
also due to the generosity of  Congress in the early 1970s. Between 1968 
and 1974 benefits were raised at a rate considerably higher than the rate of 
inflation; therefore, if  the system had been actuarially fair in real terms 
prior to 1968, it certainly would not have been after 1974. 
A natural question is, What is the magnitude of  the gains or transfers 
(i.e., benefits less contributions in expected present value terms) of the el- 
derly and how are they distributed? If the transfers are exceptionally large 
or concentrated among the affluent, a reform of the social security system 
might logically include the present retired generation giving up some of 
their gains. It is likely that additional funds or payout reductions will be 
required in the next 10 years and that major adjustments are necessary to 
operate the system over the next 75 years. The revenue sources or saving 
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could include an increase in payroll taxes for workers, an advancement of 
the retirement age, or a decrease in the benefits of  some of the currently 
retired. These measures to ensure the financial solvency of social security 
will  have intergenerational  effects. Raising the taxes of workers or in- 
creasing the retirement age will reduce the rate of  return of  the present 
working generation; cutting benefits, perhaps by making them taxable, 
will lower the gains of  today’s elderly. Because a substantial fraction of 
the elderly are far from wealthy, an across-the-board reduction in benefits 
is probably neither socially desirable nor politically feasible. However, the 
benefits of the wealthy retired could be reduced without causing undue 
economic hardship. If they have received large windfall gains through the 
social security system, fairness in restoring the financial soundness of the 
program would dictate a reduction in their benefits. 
In this paper we calculate the present value of lifetime contributions to 
the social security system of a sample of the elderly and the present value 
of  their expected benefits. The difference between the two we  call social 
security transfers. We also compute for each family in our sample the in- 
ternal rate of  return to the retirement program. That is, we determine the 
discount rate that equates the present value of taxes to the present value of 
benefits.  Our data are the Social Security Administration’s  Retirement 
History Survey. It originally interviewed slightly over 1  1,000 households 
in 1969. The head of household was between 58 and 64 years of age in 
1969. These households were reinterviewed every two years through 1979. 
In this paper we calculate social security transfers and internal rates of re- 
turn for the sample in 1969, 1975, and 1979 but use the other interview 
years to fill in missing values for our three years of primary interest. 
Our primary results are that social security transfers and rates of return 
were very high for this population in 1969 and remained high throughout 
the decade. People in our sample could expect to receive three to four 
times as much in benefits as they made in contributions, even using a 3% 
real rate of time discount and calculating death probabilities using current 
life tables. Further, and more surprising, we find that the wealthy received 
the largest transfers, and in many cases they even had the highest rates of 
return. One must conclude that the social security system as now consti- 
tuted has a substantial transfer element and that much of the transfer is 
from average workers to the wealthy retired. 
We have attempted to calculate how the rates of return and transfers of 
the social security system will evolve as the system matures over the next 
40-50  years. We  have done this by creating some synthetic work and re- 
tirement histories for six different age cohorts and examining how the so- 
cial security program,  as currently constituted, would  treat them. The 
households in this synthetic file are subject to the life hazards given by the 
1969 life tables. We  do not project changes in life expectancies that may 195  The Distributional Impact of Social Security 
occur. We find that the transfer components monotonically decrease with 
each succeeding cohort (spaced in age by  10 years) and that the median 
two-earner  household  of  the cohort now aged 38  will  receive negative 
transfers. This simply implies, of course, that they experience an internal 
rate of return lower than the 3% real rate we used in calculating transfers. 
7.2  Methods and Data 
The Retirement History Survey interview data have been merged with 
the Social Security Administration’s Earnings Record (through 1974). We 
have extended the earnings history of  each household by using the 1975, 
1977, and 1979 interview responses. We then seek to calculate social secu- 
rity transfers and internal rates of return for this cohort of households as 
of 1969, 1975, and 1979. However, we want to calculate the ex ante rate of 
return and transfers for the cohort with only the path of the social security 
program taken as given. As far as we know, no one has pointed out that 
calculations of transfers to the currently retired overstate transfers to the 
cohorts of  the retired, because the calculations do not take into account 
taxes paid by members of the cohort who did not live to retirement age. 
The currently retired are the winners in the annuity gamble; to study the 
intergenerational transfer component of social security, we  need to ac- 
count for all the taxes and benefits of cohort members whether they are 
alive at the time of the sample or not. As we  shall see, for some groups 
among the retired this is  quite an important adjustment, substantially 
lowering our estimates of  their rate of return from social security. Our 
method  of  accounting for taxes paid and benefits received by deceased 
members of the cohort is described in some detail in the Appendix, but it 
may be briefly summarized here. 
From sex- and race-specific life tables and actual social security contri- 
bution data of married survivors, we estimate taxes paid by deceased mar- 
ried members of each cohort. Some of these taxes are allocated to  widows 
to reflect the taxes paid by deceased husbands on their behalf. The remain- 
der are allocated to the surviving couples. Each single person’s history is 
similarly adjusted upward to account for deceased singles from the same 
cohort. Benefits received are treated in the same manner. That is, benefits 
already received by deceased members of this cohort are attributed to the 
survivors. In this way, we examine how an entire cohort (in this case, alive 
in 1937 at the start-up of the system) has fared with social security. These 
adjustments treat the future and the past symmetrically: future benefits 
are discounted, weighted by the probabilities of living to collect the bene- 
fits, and then summed to get the discounted expected discounted present 
value; past benefits are multiplied by the appropriate interest rates and by 
a multiple reflecting cohort size at the time benefits were collected. In 196  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoven 
1969, for example, the taxes paid by the cohort and the benefits received 
and to be received by the cohort are assigned to the surviving members of 
the cohort. 
7.3  Results 
The first of our results are shown in tables 7.1-7.3, where we report so- 
cial security taxes paid and transfers received by race and marital status 
for 1969, 1975, and 1979. The taxes are calculated according to earnings 
records to the interview year, and the benefits under the assumption that 
the person  makes no more  contributions to social security. Table 7.1 
shows that the life table adjustment makes little difference for couples in 
the sample. This is because extra taxes are attributed to interviewed cou- 
ples according to the probability that both partners of an original couple 
died before 1969, and this event has low probability. However, the taxes 
of widows and widowers (referred to in this paper as widows only because 
females predominate) are more than doubled. This occurs because the So- 
cial Security Earnings History only records the widows’ own earnings rec- 
ord and contribution profile. When we attribute to widows the contribu- 
tions made by their deceased spouses, it naturally raises substantially the 
total taxes assigned to widows. Even so, all groups, including widows, 
have substantial transfers both in absolute value and in the return ratio, 
the ratio of  the present value of  benefits to the present value of taxes. 
However, widows have smaller transfers and lower return ratios than other 
groups: they only receive the husband’s benefit rather than the husband’s 
and wife’s benefit. In most cases the taxes paid by the widow herself do 
not contribute to her benefit because the husband’s benefit is  larger. It 
should be noted that if account is not made of taxes paid by deceased hus- 
bands, one gets a completely different impression of the return ratio of 
widows.  For example, if  average actual taxes and average benefits are 
Table 7.1  Social Security Taxes and Transfers by Marital Status and Race, 1969 
(1%8  Dollars) 
Mean Benefits 
Taxes  Less Life  Median  Median 
(Life Table  Actual  Adjusted Taxes  Return  Rates of 
Adjusted) ($)  Taxes ($)  ($)  Ratio  Return 
Married  7,203  7,046  16,422  3.35  8.39 
Widows and  5,406  2,345  6,011  2.03  6.01 
Other singles  3,844  3,398  6,863  2.91  7.80 
White  6,536  5,764  13,345  3.14  7.91 
Nonwhite  4,249  3,198  7,690  2.91  7.66 
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Table 7.3  Social Security Taxes and Transfers by Marital Status and Race, 1979 
(1978 Dollars) 
Mean Benefits 
Taxes  Less Life  Median  Median 
(Life Table  Actual  Adjusted Taxes  Return  Rates of 
Adjusted) ($)  Taxes ($)  ($)  Ratio  Return 
Married  26,778  23,719  58,865  3.34  8.32 
Widows and  22,335  7,499  23,118  2.04  6.24 
Other singles  17,335  11,528  21,544  2.41  6.82 
White  24,466  16,815  42,319  2.84  7.55 
Nonwhite  19,400  9,991  27,457  2.52  6.95 
Widowers 
used, the return ratio is 4.9, higher than that of couples. If average adjusted 
taxes are used, the return ratio is 2.03. 
The internal rate of  return is that interest rate that will equate the real 
life-table-weighted stream of taxes to the real life-table-weighted stream 
of benefits, assuming future benefits will be paid according to the law in 
effect. The median rate of return of couples in 1969 was 8.39. This is a real 
rate of return and is very much greater than what is generally assumed to 
be offered by other investments. For example, in our present value calcu- 
lations for the first three columns of these tables, we have used a 3% real 
rate; the social security actuaries often use a 2.5% real rate. Over a num- 
ber of years the difference between such rates and our calculated internal 
rate of return is enormous. For example, a 60-year-old in 1969 would have 
been 28 in 1937, the year in which social security taxes were first paid. At a 
real rate of 2.5%,  a dollar contributed in 1937 would have grown to $2.20 
in real terms by 1969; at a real rate of 8.39%, a dollar contributed in 1937 
would have grown to $13.17 in real terms by 1969. At 6.01%, the widow’s 
rate of  return, it would have grown to $6.47. Over the 70 years that some 198  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoven 
people will be paying to or receiving from the social security system, even 
small differences in the rates of return will produce large differences in the 
present values. In interpreting the very high internal rates we  calculate, 
one should also note that social security contributions and benefits are 
very heavily sheltered from the personal  income tax.  The benefits are 
completely tax free, the “compounding” is done on a tax-free basis, and 
only half the contributions (the employee’s share) are subject to personal 
income tax. 
In  1969 the rate of  return of  couples was the highest of  the marital 
groups.  Many  researchers have stressed how  the system discriminates 
against two-earner couples in the sense that the contributions of the wife 
are wasted in that they do not increase the benefits of the family. Certainly 
this is true relative to one-earner couples. However, married couples as a 
group obviously do at least as well as singles since they are offered their 
choice at time of retirement between being treated as two singles or calcu- 
lating their benefits as a married couple. As a group, the married couples 
receive the highest rates of return from social security. 
Nonwhites have slightly lower rates of return than whites and signifi- 
cantly lower absolute transfers. These outcomes are caused by the higher 
mortality rates of  nonwhites, meaning that fewer live to collect benefits. 
Our calculations that attribute taxes of deceased cohort members to the 
living is more important for nonwhites. Nonwhites also have lower earn- 
ings records on average (reducing the size of the absolute transfer), and a 
larger fraction of  nonwhite couples have two earners, which tends to re- 
duce the rates of return. 
Tables 7.2  and 7.3 show social security taxes, transfers, and rates of re- 
turn for  1975 and  1979 by  race and marital status. By  1975, taxes and 
transfers of all groups had risen. The rate of return of whites had in- 
creased even further, yet the rate of return of  blacks had fallen slightly. 
The difference is undoubtedly due to the difference in mortality: a higher 
fraction of nonwhites than whites in our sample died before reaching re- 
tirement age between 1969 and 1975. The difference between life-table- 
adjusted taxes and actual taxes of widows continues to be large, and it be- 
gins to widen for other categories. By  1979, the rates of return had begun 
to fall for reasons to be discussed later. It was still the case that couples 
had higher rates than the other marital groups and that whites had higher 
rates than nonwhites. The life table adjustment has become important for 
all groups. The 1979 samples are  those aged 68-74 years, and these are cer- 
tainly a sample of winners in the annuity game. 
Tables 7.4-7.6 present results on taxes and transfers by age in  1969, 
1975, and 1979. In general, the internal rates of return and the absolute 
transfers are higher for the older households in the sample in all three in- 
terview years. This is presumably due to the maturing of the social security 
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Table 7.4  Social Security Taxes and Transfers by  Age, 1969 (1968 Dollars) 
Age of  Mean Taxes  Mean  Mean Benefits  Median  Median 
Household  (Life Table  Actual  Less Life  Return  Rates of 
Head  Adjusted) ($)  Taxes ($)  Adjusted Taxes ($)  Ratio  Return 
58  6,087  5,471  10,024  2.75  6.99 
59  6,367  5,707  10,529  2.71  7.05 
60  6,384  5,647  11,754  2.98  7.57 
61  6,635  5,534  12,514  3.12  7.92 
62  6,270  5,414  13,466  3.26  8.30 
63  6,363  5,477  14,896  3.47  8.80 
64  6,024  5,043  15,617  3.73  9.40 
Table 7.5 
Age of  Mean Taxes  Mean  Mean Benefits  Median  Median 
Household  (Life Table  Actual  Less Life  Return  Rates of 
Head  Adjusted) ($)  Taxes ($)  Adjusted Taxes ($)  Ratio  Return 
Social Security Taxes and Transfers by  Age, 1975 (1974 Dollars) 
64  14,986  12,325  28,241  3  .O  7.8 
65  15,119  12,616  29,004  3.1  8  .O 
66  14,939  12,106  28,737  3.1  7.9 
67  14,457  11,440  29,541  3.2  8.2 
68  14,225  11,082  30,496  3.3  8.3 
69  14,077  10,749  31,216  3.4  8.6 
70  13,269  9,820  32,228  3.7  9.2 
Table 7.6 
Age of  Mean Taxes  Mean  Mean Benefits  Median  Median 
Household  (Life Table  Actual  Less Life  Return  Rates of 
Head  Adjusted) ($)  Taxes ($)  Adjusted Taxes ($)  Ratio  Return 
Social Security Taxes and Transfers by  Age, 1979 (1978 Dollars) 
68  24,515  17,709  37,815  2.7  7.2 
69  24,786  18,766  39,459  2.7  7.3 
70  24,905  18,208  40,043  2.8  7.4 
71  23,954  16,755  42,200  2.9  1.7 
72  23,911  16,325  43,589  3.0  7.8 
73  23,954  15,702  45,677  3.1  8.1 
74  22,484  14,077  47,438  3.3  8.5 
up gains of a pay-as-you-go retirement plan. The difference is most strik- 
ing in 1969. Recall our assumption that no future contributions are made 
to the system. In 1969, the youngest cohort must wait four years to retire, 
so discounting has a substantial effect. 
Table 7.7 collects some of the rate-of-return results from tables 7.4-7.6. 
It shows that the real internal rate of  return to social security increased 
from 1969 to 1975 for the younger cohorts in our sample, even when both 200  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoven 
Table 1.1  Rate of  Return by Cohort 
1969  1975  1979 
Cohort  Rate  Age  Rate  Age  Rate  Age 
7  7.0  58  7.8  64  7.2  68 
6  7.0  59  8.0  65  7.3  69 
5  7.6  60  7.9  66  7.4  70 
4  7.9  61  8.2  61  1.7  71 
3  8.3  62  8.3  68  7.8  72 
2  8.8  63  8.6  69  8.1  73 
1  9.4  64  9.2  70  8.5  74 
taxes and benefits are life table adjusted. The real return decreased for the 
oldest two cohorts between 1969 and 1975 and also decreased for house- 
holds of all ages between 1975 and 1979. The net change was an increase in 
the rate of return between 1969 and 1979 for the youngest two cohorts and 
a fairly sharp decline for the oldest three. These differences are probably 
the result of two factors: first, changes in the law between 1969 and 1975 
increased the rates of return, but after 1975 changes in the law only in- 
creased the future real payments of  workers through double indexing. 
This, however, had no effect on the real payments of  retired people. Sec- 
ond, because delayed retirement between ages 62 and 65 is roughly actu- 
arially fair at a 3% real interest rate, a delay in retirement will decrease the 
internal rate from the high values shown here. Of course, the internal rate 
will decrease even faster when someone works after the age of 65. 
Tables 7.8-7.10 show social security transfers, return ratios, and inter- 
nal rates of return by wealth quartile and by age in 1969, 1975, and 1979. 
The wealth variable is quite comprehensive in that it includes the value of 
home, business, and farm equity, other real property, stocks, bonds, bank 
accounts, pensions, and capitalized value of welfare payments, and the 
capitalized insurance value of Medicare. It excludes social security wealth 
and human capital. Table 7.8 indicates that social security transfers in- 
crease sharply by wealth quartile, especially if  taxes are adjusted by the 
life tables. We feel such an adjustment is necessary to get a true picture of 
the way a cohort has fared with social security. The median life-table- 
adjusted transfer to those in the top wealth quartile is more than $6000 
higher than that to those in the lowest wealth quartile, a 69% difference. 
The reason  that  the increase with wealth is  greater  for the life-table- 
adjusted numbers is that widows are heavily represented in the lower part 
of the wealth distribution, and the tax adjustment for mortality is much 
greater  for them than for other groups.  The increasing transfers with 
wealth are also due to the greater contributions of the wealthy to social se- 201  The Distributional Impact of Social Security 
curity, a system that offered this generation a rate of return far greater 
than our 3% discount rate. The importance of using life-adjusted taxes is 
also shown in the return ratios: with unadjusted taxes, it appears that the 
lowest wealth quartile has a somewhat higher ratio of benefits to taxes 
than the other quartiles, yet when account is made of taxes paid by the de- 
ceased, the return ratio is almost flat across the quartiles. 
Finally, the rates of  return shown in table 7.8 are almost the same for 
the wealth groups. Most researchers would find this result surprising be- 
cause the social security benefit schedule has considerable progressivity. 
Apparently that is neutralized by the taxes paid by the deceased and, pos- 
sibly, by a different time pattern of contributions. For example, holding 
constant total undiscounted nominal contributions, the rate of return will 
increase if the contributions are made late in life rather than early. 
Table 7.8 also shows how the transfers, return ratios, and rates of  re- 
turn vary by age within quartiles. It is important to disaggregate by age be- 
cause both wealth and the rate of return vary positivity by age. Table 7.8 
shows that at each age the transfers to those in the wealthiest quartile are 
much greater than the transfers to those in the lowest wealth quartile. In 
fact, for a couple of age groups the transfers are almost twice as great to 
the wealthy as to the poor. Table 7.8 shows that the internal rates of return 
are fairly flat across wealth quartiles; the highest rate of return recorded is 
for the upper wealth quartile among our eldest cohort, the 64-year-olds. 
Table 7.9 contains similar results for 1975. The wealth and transfer fig- 
ures are in 1974 dollars. The difference between adjusted and unadjusted 
taxes has become more important as reflected in the difference between 
the two transfer measures. Even more than in 1969, the unadjusted median 
return ratio gives a substantially different impression than the adjusted 
median return ratio: the one indicates that in percentage terms the poorer 
elderly gained more than the wealthy elderly, whereas the second indicates 
they did worse. The life-table-adjusted transfers to  the wealthiest quartile 
are roughly double the transfers to the poorest quartile at every age except 
70. Even their rates of return are highest at every age. 
The results for 1979 as shown in table 7.10 are similar to the 1975 re- 
sults: the adjustment for taxes according to the life table is important and, 
in fact, removes the negative correlation of  the median return ratio with 
wealth quartile. The internal rates of return are down somewhat from 
1975, most particularly for those in the wealthiest quartile. The apparent 
explanation is that those who worked past age 65 lowered their rates of re- 
turn and that more of the relatively wealthy did that than those in the lower 
wealth quartiles. The overall result of  tables 7.8-7.10,  however, still re- 
mains that among the current elderly the wealthy have enjoyed the same 
high rate of return from social security as the poorer members of their age 
cohort. Table 7.8  Social Security Transfers and Rates of Return by  Non-Social-Security, Non-Human-Capital Wealth Quartiles, 1969 
Wealth Quartiles 
W I  $16,572  $16,572  <  W  5  $32,188  $32,188  <  W  5  $64,691  $64,691  <  W 












































































































































































































Note: Wealth and transfer amounts are in 1968 dollars. The number of households is 10,715. Table 7.9  Social Security Transfers and Ra’tes of  Return by Non-Social-Security, Non-Human-Capital Wealth Quartiles,  1975 
Wealth Quartiles 
W  5 $19,752  $19,752  <  W  5 $43,678  $43,678  <  W  5 $83,804  $83,804  <  W 












































































































































































































Note: Wealth and transfer amounts are in 1974 dollars. The number of households is 8070. Table 7.10  Social Security Transfers and Rates of Return by Non-Social-Security,  Non-Human-Capital Wealth Quartiles, 1979 
Wealth Quartiles 
W I $19,797  $19,797  <  W  5 $50,548  $50,548 c  W  5 $103,511  $103,511 <  W 
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Note: Wealth and transfer amounts are in 1978 dollars. The number of households is 7137. 208  Michael D. HurdIJohn B. Shoven 
7.4  Simulations 
In this section we calculate the projected transfers and rates of return 
for six age cohorts, four household types, and three levels of earnings his- 
tories. This gives us some information about the intergenerational trans- 
fers implied by the social security system and predicts how the intragener- 
ational transfers will change for later cohorts. It also shows the effects of 
the maturing of the system on the rate of return it offers. 
The household  types examined are single males, single females, and 
one- and two-earner married couples. We have collected data on median 
annual earnings for men and women by age from 1937 to 1977. These data 
were extended through the year 2020 with the assumption that median 
earnings grow at 10% from 1977 to 1982 and 6% thereafter. The accuracy 
of this assumption is not critical to our analysis because we use it only to 
generate the nominal earnings histories of our simulated households; that 
our profiles exactly match median values is relatively unimportant. We 
project 2% productivity growth, and therefore 4% CPI inflation, beyond 
1982. For the simulated single men and women, we create three earnings 
profiles from age 20 to age 65, or, for the older cohorts, from 1937 until 
retirement at age 65. The low earnings profile is set at one-half the median 
earnings pattern, while the high earnings profile is set at the maximum 
earnings level subject to social security payroll taxes or five times the me- 
dian, whichever is less. The one-earner married couples are assigned earn- 
ings histories equivalent to the single males, while the taxes of  the two- 
earner married couples are the sum of those of a low-earning single male 
and female, a median-earning  male and a low-earning woman, and, finally, a 
high-earning male and a median-earning woman. All told, there are 12 
simulated households in each age cohort; three earnings profiles for each 
of four household types. The age cohorts are people who reach age 65 in 
1970,1980,1990,2000,2010, and 2020. Husbands and wives are assumed 
to be the same age. 
Unlike in the previous section, our simulations do not include widows. 
The single households have been life-long singles and their taxes reflect 
their own contributions plus the contributions of singles who, according 
to the life tables, die before age 65. The taxes of marrieds are also life table 
adjusted, but only for married couples where both spouses fail to reach 
age 65. After retirement, assumed to take place at age 65, we keep track of 
the joint survival probabilities of married couples and credit the benefits 
received  during the  resulting  widowhood  after  the  death  of  the first 
spouse. 
Table 7.11 shows the internal rates of return for the 12 simulated house- 
holds in six age cohorts. Several clarifications are necessary before these 
can be properly interpreted. First, these rates of return are done in an “ex 
ante” sense from age 65. By that we mean that individuals assume that the 
annuities they receive will remain constant in real terms (except for re- Table 7.11  Projected Internal Rates of  Return by Household 'Qpe  and by Age Cohort 
Demographic 
Status 
Year in Which Head of Household Becomes 65 
Earnings 
Profile  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  2020 
Single males  Low 
Median 
High 
Single women  Low 
Median 
High 

























































Married couples  Low/low  8.8  6.4  4.4  3.5  3.3  3.2 
Median  /low  7.7  6.0  3.9  3.1  2.7  2.6 
High/median  6.7  5.1  3.4  2.6  2.2  1.9 
Note: Benefits and taxes were projected according to the law at time of retirement except in 1970 where inflation indexation was assumed. 210  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoven 
duced survivor benefits), and they do not take into account changes which 
may take effect ex post. Second, and similarly, the benefits and taxes paid 
out and collected after 1983 in our calculations are those projected in the 
Annual  Statistical  Supplement  of  the  Social Security Bulletin (1980). 
Thus, these are not adjusted for changes that appear to be necessary to 
balance aggregate social security retirement benefits and taxes. The effect 
of  the proposed changes will be to drive down the real rates of return for 
the younger cohorts, almost  certainly making them negative for high- 
earning single males and some two-earner couples. The rates of return re- 
ported in table 7.11, then, should be taken as absolute upper bounds for 
these households and age cohorts since all signs indicate that they will pay 
more taxes and receive lower benefits than those officially projected in the 
Social Security Bulletin and used in these calculations. 
The internal rates of return calculated for the 1970 cohort are consistent 
with our earlier examination of  the Retirement History Survey popula- 
tion. Again, it should be emphasized that our simulated singles do not in- 
clude widows. Within each household type the higher-earnings household 
has a lower rate of return. However, our earlier results indicated that this 
did not imply that wealthier retired households had lower rates of  return 
on social security. The projected decline with cohort age in real internal 
rates of return is monotonic and substantial. For example, the median sin- 
gle female retiring in 1970 has an expected real rate of  return of 9.1  Yo. If 
she reached age 65 in 2000, however, she would only enjoy an expected 
3.8% return. Single women earn higher rates than single men, not only 
due to their longer life expectancy but also due to their lower earnings pro- 
files. 
The results of table 7.11 indicate that those reaching age 65 in 1970 and 
1980 were among those receiving windfall gains from the start-up and ex- 
pansion of  a pay-as-you-go social security scheme. The 1970 cohort en- 
joyed higher rates partly because it had a shorter history of tax payments 
(this generation was 32 years old in 1937). The 1980 cohort and to a lesser 
extent the 1990 cohort did well because social security tax rates were low 
during a substantial fraction of their work lives. Consistent with the re- 
sults of the previous section, we find that the start-up and expansion gains 
are diminishing but that they extend over a longer period than is commonly 
realized. Those who retired on social security from 1940 to 1990 will enjoy 
some of these gains, and a noticeable fraction of the elderly population 
will be in this category until the year 2010. 
The life-table-adjusted expected social security transfers in 1970 dollars 
are shown in table 7.12 for our simulated households. Again, the results 
are roughly in  accord with our examination of the Retirement History 
Survey population. As in the previous section, the real discount rate used 
in the transfer calculations was 3%. For the households retiring in 1970, 
social security was “a good deal,” and in most cases the higher earnings Table 7.12  Projected Transfers by  Cohort (1980 Dollars) 
Year in Which Head of  Household Becomes 65 
Demographic  Earnings 
Status  Profile  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  2020 
Single males  Low  20,980  20,718  2,524  -  12,556  -  19,052  -  25,410 
Median  25,615  23,994  -  13,690  -  48,670  -  69,237  -  88,482 
High  23,332  18,748  -  19,301  -64,713  -  121,610  -  179,654 
Single women  Low  25,784  28,270  23,746  22,255  21,513  24,649 
Median  32,027  34,660  21,169  14,915  9,825  9.377 
High  41,861  45,819  13,921  -  17,324  -  56,982  -  96,659 
Married couples  Low/zero  46,077  60,296  45,282  38,150  36,693  42,649 
Medianhero  63,425  87,293  5 1,960  30,664  16,596  16,596 
Married couples  Low/low  47,704  55,587  33,651  19,139  11,759  10,858 
High/zero  63,907  88,025  53,996  27,707  -  7,351  -  41,365 
Median /low  58,052  76,031  33,758  5,250  -  17,564  -25,915 
High/median  59,384  68,934  19,265  -23,122  -  75,670  -  126,388 
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households received larger transfers because they were allowed to partici- 
pate in this good deal to a greater extent. This effect offset the somewhat 
lower internal rate earned by households with higher earnings profiles, as 
shown in the previous table. For the younger cohorts, the level of  trans- 
fers is much lower (and in some cases negative), and their pattern across 
earnings profiles is  very different. Consider the higher-earnings house- 
holds retiring in the year 2010 or later; rather than being allowed to par- 
ticipate in a larger extent in a good deal (which was the case for the high 
earners earlier), those with high earnings in the later cohorts are forced to 
participate to a larger extent in a program that offers them a poor return. 
Each of our high-earnings household types retiring in the year 2010 has 
negative transfers. The progressive nature of the program, which has had 
essentially no impact on those who have retired to date, is strongly evident 
by the year 2010. The reforms currently being discussed will not only fur- 
ther lower the transfer numbers of the young cohorts but may add to the 
strong progressive pattern of  the transfer figures already projected  for 
them under current law. 
7.5  Conclusion 
We have examined the real rates of return and the transfers in the retire- 
ment (OASI) component of  social security. Most of our analysis uses the 
Retirement History Survey population, which ranged in age from 58 to 64 
in 1969 and which was interviewed six times from 1969 to 1979. Our pri- 
mary result is that this generation did extremely well on social security, 
earning a real rate of return of  roughly 8%. We  calculated this number 
taking into account the taxes paid by the unfortunate cohort members 
who did not live to retirement age, and found this to  be an important cor- 
rection. Without it, we would get even higher rates of return for the RHS 
household population. 
We examined the rates of return and transfers by marital status, race, 
and age. The results were that the married couples had higher rates of re- 
turn than singles in the RHS population and that nonwhites did less well 
than whites. The lowest rates of  return were for widows when account is 
taken of the taxes paid by the deceased spouses. 
Perhaps our most interesting result, other than the high rate of return 
itself, is that the rate of return does not decline with wealth for this popu- 
lation sample. In fact, the wealthy in the RHS population have earned 
roughly the same high rate of  return as their poorer cohort members and 
have enjoyed far higher absolute transfers. 
In the final section of the paper we simulated the evolution of the im- 
pact of the social security system on 12 household types. We project that 
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cantly even before the social security changes now contemplated. The 
transfer components become negative for some households; for example, 
the negative transfer is projected at $180,000 (1980  $) for high-income sin- 
gle males currently age 27. The intergenerational transfers are extremely 
large and the intragenerational distribution of transfers is quite different 
(more progressive) for the currently young than it is for the presently el- 
derly. 
The results of this paper should be useful in assessing how the social se- 
curity system could be revised. It indicates that the idea that all current re- 
tirees should be protected from cuts and only those who will retire in 20 or 
more years should be asked to rescue the system would lead to a policy of 
protecting those who have done well at the expense of  those who are al- 
ready  projected  to do poorly.  Of  course,  this  consideration  must  be 
weighted against the financial flexibility of the young relative to the cur- 
rently elderly. 
Appendix 
Calculation of Present Value of Taxes and Benefits, 
and Rate of Return 
The basic principle is that all taxes paid and benefits received by a cohort 
will be allocated to surviving members of the cohort. Unless this is done 
the survivors will appear to have received above-average rates of return 
even under an actuarially fair annuity system. We  distingish groups ac- 
cording to marital status (married, single, or widowed), sex, and race. 
Consider first a single person of age A with a stream of past taxes, t;, 
and of past benefits, b;.  Let Pi be the probability that a person will live to 
age A given that he has reached age i.  Thus, for each person of age A there 
were 1/P;  persons living at age i.  There were on average ti(l/P; - 1) taxes 
paid at age i by people who died before reaching age A and who had simi- 
lar tax histories to the surviving person in the sample. The present value of 
these taxes over all ages less than A is 
i= I 
where 0; is the price level adjustment. ri was taken to be a constant 3%. 
This number was added to the present value of taxes actually paid to get 
the total of taxes paid by the person in the sample and by similar people 
who did not survive until age A.  Because the sample is self-weighting, ag- 
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the cohort, provided mortality rates are independent of tax contributions. 
The mortality probabilities are race and sex specific; they are calculated 
from the 1969 life tables. 
The present value of past benefits received by the cohort is calculated in 
a way symmetric to the calculation of taxes. 
Now consider a widow in the 1969  sample. The data only include her tax 
contributions, which will be treated in the same way as the taxes of a single 
person. However, in almost all cases her benefits are based on the taxes of 
her deceased husband, and a rate-of-return calculation should take those 
into account. This is done by allocating part of the taxes paid by deceased 
husbands to the widows. The general reasoning is that for each surviving 
couple there were additional couples who paid taxes but did not survive as 
couples. Some survived as widows, some as widowers, and some had no 
survivors. From the life tables and our data on the tax histories of hus- 
bands, we can calculate taxes paid by deceased husbands in the same way 
as was done for singles. That amount multiplied by the probability that 
the wife survived is allocated to widows; the remainder is allocated to sur- 
viving couples. More specifically, if  ti is the tax stream of a husband in the 
sample, ET =  ti(l/Pi -  1) Pi(l + ri)A-j is the present value of  taxes 
paid by deceased husbands who were similar to the surviving husband. ET 
multiplied by the probability the wife survives until the survey year is allo- 
cated to widows, and the remainder is allocated to married couples in the 
sample.  The allocation for widows is  summed over all couples.  That 
amount divided by the number of widows is added to the life-table-adjusted 
taxes actually paid by each widow on her own earnings record. In princi- 
ple, the taxes paid by  deceased wives should be similarly allocated be- 
tween the couple and widowers, but for simplicity we allocated all of them 
to the couples: wives have small tax contribution histories, and the prob- 
ability that the husband outlives the wife is small. Again, it is assumed 
that the mortality rates are independent of taxes. In addition, we assume 
independence between mortality rates of husbands and wives. Past bene- 
fits are treated symmetrically to taxes. 
The present value of  future benefits uses the 1969 life tables. Mortality 
probabilities of husbands and wives are assumed to be independent. The 
following provisions of the law were taken into consideration: actuarial 
reduction for early retirement; 1’70 benefit increase for work past age 65; a 
wife may draw on her own record or her husband’s record; a widow may 
draw at age 60 at a reduced fraction of her husband’s PIA, but at age 62 
she can switch to her own record if it yields a higher benefit; the PIA cal- 
culation is based on the law in effect in the year of the calculation; a wid- 
ow’s benefit is reduced if her former husband drew benefits before he was 
65 or if she draws benefits before she is 65. 
A 
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The rate of return in year Tis calculated in the following way. Let ti and 
bi be the life-table-adjusted real stream of taxes and benefits of an individ- 
ual. The ti will be zero prior to year of employment and after retirement. 
The bi will be zero before retirement; after T, they will be calculated ac- 
cording to the social security law in effect in year T. The rate of return in 
year Tsolves the equation  ti(l + r)T-i,  where Nis 
the maximum age and 0 < T < N. 
N  T 
b;(l + r)T-i  = 
i=O  i=O 
Comment  Henry J. Aaron 
Social security annually receives about 5% of gross national product in 
taxes and pays out roughly the same amount in benefits. In any year there 
is little overlap between taxpayers and beneficiaries. At some time during 
their lifetimes, however, most workers are both taxpayers and beneficiaries. 
Most economists agree that an annual perspective is not useful for mea- 
suring such redistribution as may occur under social security. It is inad- 
equate because any kind of insurance would appear redistributive from an 
annual perspective, even if  premiums and benefits were set according to 
strict actuarial rules. Thus, redistribution would appear where none was 
occurring over time or among risk groups. 
Hurd and Shoven argue that the lifetime is the appropriate period over 
which to measure the amount of redistribution that occurs under the so- 
cial security system. They focus on the lifetime not of  individuals but of 
age cohorts of individuals. They calculate the present value of the total 
taxes paid by various cohorts and of the benefits that they will receive, dis- 
counted at a 3% real interest rate. By focusing on cohorts they deal auto- 
matically with the fact that not everyone survives to receive the retirement 
benefits to which their own earnings entitle them or to which the earnings 
of others might entitle them. 
Under the social security system, of course, death of a covered worker 
or retiree often triggers survivor benefits for surviving relatives; and early 
withdrawal from the labor force because of disability, followed by death 
before age 65, triggers first disability and then survivor benefits. These 
benefits flow not only to spouses but also to children and sometimes to 
others. Hurd and Shoven disregard disability and survivor benefits paid 
to relatives other than surviving spouses; presumably they also exclude the 
portion of payroll taxes that cover these benefits. In the case of couples of 
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different ages, Hurd and Shoven assign to the surviving widow (or widower) 
the benefits paid after a spouse’s death and a portion of the taxes imposed 
previously on the spouse. They do not explain in their paper how the divi- 
sion of taxes is made, but I assume that they assign a portion of the total 
taxes paid by the active worker equal to the ratio of the present value of 
taxes paid to the surviving spouse to the present value of all benefits paid 
to the surviving spouse and to the couple before the spouse’s death. They 
make no mention of dependents or survivors benefits in addition to those 
paid to workers and their  spouses. After describing the results,  I  shall 
comment on the assignment of benefits and taxes in analyzing the distri- 
butional consequences of taxes and transfers. 
Hurd and Shoven find that the internal rate of return has been hand- 
some for cohorts reaching retirement age in time to be interviewed in the 
1969 Retirement History Survey. Couples did better than other aged per- 
sons, with internal rates of return of more than 8% and median ratios of 
benefits to costs of more than 3.3. Whites did slightly better than blacks, 
despite the progressivity of  the benefit formula and the lower average 
earnings of blacks, because blacks die before receiving benefits more of- 
ten than do whites.’ These rates increase somewhat in the 1975 survey, 
presumably because Congress liberalized benefits in 1972. They decline in 
the 1979 survey and will continue to decline, unless benefits are liberalized 
again, because the sustained payment of benefits greater than the growth 
of the labor force and real wages is not possible in a pay-as-you-go social 
security system. This fact shows up in the tables presenting results for in- 
dividual age cohorts, which reveal that older age groups enjoy higher ra- 
tios of benefits to costs and higher median rates of return than do younger 
cohorts. Hurd and Shoven adopt a computational simplification that con- 
tributes to this result. They exclude expected tax payments between date 
of interview and expected retirement  and discount expected benefits to 
present values. 
Hurd and Shoven also find that the absolute difference between bene- 
fits and costs increases with wealth. The transfer to the top and next-to- 
the-top cohorts are about equal in 1969, but both are larger than that re- 
ceived by the second quartile, which is larger than that received by the 
first. Much the same situation obtains in 1975, although the top quartile 
begins to do a bit better than the one just below it. By  1979, the absolute 
transfer to the bottom quartile has moved past that going to the second 
quartile but remains below those of the top two quartiles. One would ex- 
pect that with the passage of time, as the internal rate of return declined, 
the pattern of transfers at a 2.5%  discount rate would reverse; eventually 
the bottom wealth classes will receive algebraically larger transfers than 
do the top wealthy classes. As of now, however, low-wealth workers may 
receive higher rates of  return or higher ratios of  benefits to costs than do 
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system has exceeded the marginal cost (because the benefits to early par- 
ticipants in a pay-as-you-go social security system have overwhelmed ev- 
erything else), the wealthy receive larger absolute transfers. 
One may approach the analysis in this paper from one or more of three 
standpoints. Are the analytical techniques innovative and worth studying 
for future use? Are the results novel and interesting? Do the results have 
clear relevance to important questions of policy? 
Methods of  Analysis 
The methods of analysis that Hurd and Shoven use are well established 
in most respects. Both Leimer and Petri (1981) and Aaron (1977) analyzed 
the distributional effects of social security on cohorts. Burkhauser and 
Warlick (1981) found that the excess of the present value of benefits over 
costs rose irregularly with permanent income. Like Hurd and Shoven, 
Aaron also took account of differences in life expectancy by income, race, 
and education. 
Hurd and Shoven emphasize the importance of  viewing the effects of 
social security ex ante with respect to  mortality. But this adjustment raises 
other difficult questions. Ex ante, say at age 18, few people know whether 
they will reach retirement  single, married, widowed, or divorced.  Few 
know with certainty where life’s vicissitudes will bring them in the distri- 
bution of permanent income. About all that they know for sure is their 
race, sex, and birthdate. A consistent ex ante calculation would require 
the specification of the ex ante probabilities not just of death but of all 
events relevant to the calculation of the present value of  social security 
benefits and taxes.* In short, a true ex ante calculation of redistribution is 
likely to be damnably difficult, and Hurd and Shoven have not done it. 
Even worse, such a calculation would shed no light on many of the 
questions about redistribution in which most of  us  are interested. As a 
practical matter, we are interested as well in ex post outcomes and ex post 
redistribution. We do want to know how various income classes fare, how 
one- and two-earner couples are treated relative to single, divorced, or wi- 
dowed persons, and so on. To measure ex post redistribution, we need to 
measure the record of completed payments for people who actually move 
through the system. It makes sense within such an ex post framework to 
compare the relative treatment of couples, single persons, widows, and 
widowers. But it makes no sense within an ex ante framework, unless one 
is prepared to shoulder the monumental task of calculating ex ante prob- 
abilities of marriage, divorce, death of a spouse, and earnings achieve- 
ment. 
One may view the Hurd and Shoven calculations as ex post calcula- 
tions, except with respect to mortality. But ex post calculations have im- 
peratives of their own-for  example, survivors and disability benefits, a 
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similar problems. Despite the progressivity of the social security benefit 
formula and relatively low average lifetime earnings, blacks according to 
Hurd and Shoven receive a smaller internal rate of return than do   white^.^ 
The reason for this result is that mortality rates for blacks are higher than 
for whites up to about age 65. Blacks, therefore, have a lower probability 
than whites of claiming retirement benefits. But the fact of higher mortal- 
ity and the correlated higher incidence of disability means that blacks are 
disproportionate beneficiaries of  survivor and disability benefits.  Simply 
subtracting a proportion of payroll taxes from taxes paid that equals the 
average cost of survivors and disability benefits does not help at all. The 
essence of the problem is that complementary programs produce comple- 
mentary benefits that exactly undo one of the more striking and misusable 
re~ults.~  And what sense does it make to  compute separate rates of return 
for widows and widowers separately from those for couples in a life-cycle 
contest, as widowers and widows, by definition, were once part of a cou- 
ple and some will yet be. This distinction is a speck of “annual perspec- 
tive” clogging the gears of a life-cycle calculation. 
Thus, the most useful framework for analysis probably is ex post. But 
proper application requires that one measure all of the benefits a cohort 
receives. Furthermore, such measurement requires that one hypothesize 
what would happen in the absence of the program. For example, if social 
security replaces privately financed transfers, from the covered worker to 
spouses or other dependents that would be made in the absence of the 
public program, the benefits as well as the costs accrue to the worker. If 
the benefits are in addition to those the worker would have provided vol- 
untarily, the benefits accrue to the spouse or dependent and the tax to the 
worker. Here may be the reason Hurd and Shoven and others have fo- 
cused on retirement benefits-they  accrue to one or both members of a 
couple which we feel more comfortable treating as a unit in the life-cycle 
framework. Of course, such benefits may replace or increase intergenera- 
tional transfers, as Barro has pointed  out. This possibility underscores 
once again that analysis of redistribution through social security and other 
programs usually  implies a particular  underlying  framework  of  utility 
maximization and makes sense only within it. 
Results 
The results that this paper generates are not new, but they are an exam- 
ple of  a product all too rare in economics, the confirmation of previous 
findings with a new set of data.5 
The findings are in the “it’s-not-surprising-when-you-think-about-it” 
class. If benefits rise with earnings, then the first cohort to receive benefits 
in a pay-as-you-go system will receive very high internal rates of  return, 
and the excess of  benefits over costs to that cohort will rise with income 
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nal rate of return will equal the sum of the rates of growth of population 
and of real wages, subject to  variations in life expectancy, labor force par- 
ticipation rates, retirement ages, and other factors that might affect the 
ratio of the number of  active workers to beneficiaries.  There will be no 
transfer component, if benefits and taxes are discounted at this internal 
interest rate, other than intracohort redistribution that arises from non- 
proportionality of the benefit formula. Of course, internal rates of return 
may vary widely over time depending on  variations of birth rates, produc- 
tivity, and other factors, and among households at any given time, de- 
pending on  the benefit formula and personal characteristics. 
Between opening day and maturity, rates of return will drop and, if the 
benefit  formula is progressive,  like that in social security, the bonus to 
high-income (and relatively wealthy) beneficiaries will reverse. Stated this 
way, the result is not surprising. 
Policy 
The most important question is, having been shown this result,  how 
much  the man on the street  or his  elected  representative  would  have 
learned that is relevant to public policy. Hurd and Shoven stated that they 
think he would have learned a lot: “If [the wealthy retired] have received 
large windfall gains through the social security system, fairness in restor- 
ing the financial soundness of  the program would indicate a reduction in 
their benefits.’’ 
I am not sure quite what this statement means, quite apart from the im- 
plicit allusion to an accepted metric for measuring fairness. Should bene- 
fits be reduced for the 70-year-old newly retired dentist? The 65-year-old 
formerly  disabled  steelworker?  The 85-year-old  rich  widow?  At least 
some beneficiaries in each of these classes will be receiving above-average 
benefits and, as Hurd and Shoven show, above-average net transfers.  If 
their benefits  are to be cut, how is it to be done? By  a comprehensive 
wealth test? By an income test and, if so, repeated how often? By a ret. 3- 
active cut in the benefit  formula? Or should the cut be applied only to 
those who have not yet claimed benefits, presumably on the ground that 
people should be given some warning? But how much warning? Not 20 
years, we are told. One year? Five? Ten? 
These questions are rhetorical, but they raise a serious point. As econo- 
mists we are much and properly concerned with property rights. The Con- 
stitution  protects  certain  forms of  property  from seizure without  due 
process of law. An extensive literature exists analogizing various features 
of  the economic arrangements to property in which people  have rights 
somehow defined. Tax reformers are alert to the problem of capitalization 
and to the limitations that it places on optimal changes in tax laws. As 
Feldstein (1976) pointed out, optimal tax reform may depend sensitively 
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form of changes in market prices, which are then ratified by transactions, 
a possibility that undergirds the saying, sometimes suggestive, sometimes 
wrong, that an old tax is a good tax. But capitalization may also take the 
form of investments in human capital or acquired habits that are costly or 
painful to change. For the same reason that we are cautious in changing 
taxes that are capitalized or that are embodied in contracts or that may 
have induced  other economic behavior,  we  should  hesitate  before we 
modify transfers on the expectation of which people may have based be- 
havior that is costly or impossible to reverse.  That does not mean that 
benefits once given should never be withdrawn. But it does mean that one 
should be modest about claiming fairness and that one is obliged to de- 
scribe how one proposes to achieve an objective, however self-evident its 
fairness may appear. 
In summary, the methods that this paper applies are familiar but subject 
to important challenge,  the results confirm previous findings, and their 
applicability to public policy is yet to  be established. 
Notes 
1.  This fact arises from the higher mortality rates of blacks before age 65. Mortality rates 
of blacks and whites after age 65 are virtually identical. 
2. Even if in some data heaven one might hope to get information sufficient for such cal- 
culations, one would not be able to get them from a survey like the Retirement History Sur- 
vey. 
3. This result appears inconsistent with the findings of Frieden et al. (1976) based on actu- 
al social security earnings and benefit records. The exclusion of two-earner families in Frie- 
den et al. may resolve this apparent inconsistency. 
4.  These comments are more mea culpa than criticism, as they apply with just as much 
force to work I have done as they do to this paper. 
5. The other rare but useful scientific contribution is the test of a set of conclusions for ro- 
bustness, based on slight variations in specification using the same body of data. 
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